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Burns v. State, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 50 (Sep. 23, 2021)1 
Criminal Law: SCOPE OF A MID-TRIAL WAIVER OF APPELLATE RIGHTS 
Summary: 
 On appeal from a judgment of conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court considers the scope 
of a mid-trial waiver of appellate rights.  
Background: 
 Appellant David Burns was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to 
commit murder, burglary while in possession of a firearm, two counts of robbery with the use of 
a deadly weapon, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder with the use of a 
deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon. These charges arose from a home 
robbery in which a woman was shot and killed, and her twelve-year-old daughter was shot but 
survived. After the State filed a notice to seek the death penalty, the case proceeded to a jury 
trial. 
 Burns and the State presented a Stipulation and Order (Agreement) for the district court’s 
approval which contained two provisions. First, if the jury were to find him guilty of first-degree 
murder, Burns agreed to waive a penalty hearing before the jury and agreed to a sentence of life 
without parole. Second, in exchange for Burns’ waiver of “all appellate rights stemming from the 
guilt phase of the trial”, the State agreed to withdraw the notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty.  The district court approved the Agreement. 
 After the jury found Burns guilty on all charges, the district court sentenced Burns to life 
without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction. Burns’ counsel, believing 
that Burns would have a better likelihood of success in a postconviction habeas proceeding, 
declined to file a direct appeal because of the waiver. The court held that Burns’ trial counsel 
was ineffective for not filing a direct appeal. Thus, Burns filed this untimely direct appeal under 
NRAP 4(c). The appeal considers the scope of Burns’ mid-trial waiver of appellate rights and 
then the merits of the nonwaived claims. 
Discussion: 
Burns’ waiver covered all allegations of error except those related to voir dire, closing 
arguments, and sentencing 
 The State claimed that Burns waived the right to appellate review of every error he raises 
in his appeal because the scope of “the guilt phase of the trial” referenced in the agreement 
encompasses them all. Burns challenges the scope of the appeal waiver, not its validity. 
Although the Agreement did not include a guilty plea, it is a contract to the same extent as a 
written plea agreement. Holding that contract principles apply when analyzing a written guilty 
plea agreement, the court decided to construe the Agreement from its plain language and enforce 
as written, noting that any ambiguities must be construed against the State. 
 
1  By Kalin Olson. 
 The Agreement did not explain what constitutes “the guilt phase of the trial”. Typically, 
this phrase is used to distinguish between the parts of a bifurcated criminal trial when guilt is 
determined versus sentencing. It is fairly clear when the guilt phase of a trial ends, but much less 
clear when the guilt phase of a trial actually begins. The lack of clarity led the court to conclude 
that the Agreement was ambiguous in that respect, and, construing the ambiguity in the 
defendant’s favor, Burns’ Batson2 claim is outside the scope of his waiver. 
  In this case, "the guilt phase of the trial" in the Agreement's waiver provision 
encompassed Burns' claims stemming from every part of the proceedings after the jury was 
impaneled up until the verdict was returned. This shows that the waiver in the Agreement 
includes closing arguments. However, during a discussion about the Agreement, Burns' counsel 
stated that Burns was not waiving review of any misconduct that may occur during closing 
arguments. With this understanding, the Court concludes that all of Burns’ claims, except those 
related to voir dire, closing arguments, and sentencing, fall under the appeal waiver’s scope.  
The district court did not err in denying a Batson challenge during jury selection 
 Burns alleges that the district court improperly denied his challenge to the State’s 
peremptory removal of a prospective juror. This allegation is governed by the three-step analysis 
given by the Supreme Court in Batson: Once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made 
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the 
proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-
neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent 
of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. 
Burns objected to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove Juror 91, who did 
not identify his race, but stated that he had emigrated from India. After examining whether Burns 
made a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the Court ruled that he did not meet the step one 
standard of a showing of discrimination. Even if Burns had met the standard of showing, the 
Court found that the juror’s answers to the death penalty questions were sufficient justifications 
to show that there had not been a showing under step three of the Batson analysis. The district 
court did not err in denying a Batson challenge during jury selection where defense counsel 
offered no explanation besides anecdotes from other cases counsel had argued and references to 
other matters before the court 
The State did not engage in reversible prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments 
Burns claims that the State engaged in multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct 
during its closing arguments. The Court determines whether the prosecutor’s conduct was 




2  Batson v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 79 (1986). 
3  Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172 (2008). 
Referring to defense counsel 
 During its rebuttal argument, the State made comments to which Burns objected, saying  
the comments were disparaging counsel. The court overruled and Burns alleges that this was a 
reversible prosecutorial misconduct of a constitutional dimension. While disparaging remarks 
directed toward defense counsel, the comments made by the State were not directed at opposing 
counsel with the purpose to belittle them and did not amount to misconduct.  
Referring to a non-testifying witness 
Prosecutorial comments on the defense’s failure to produce evidence or call witnesses are 
generally improper, as such comments tend to shift the burden of proof to the defense,4 but are 
permissible when they go to the defense’s theory of what happened. When Burns referenced a 
non-testifying witness during his closing argument, the prosecution’s response was permissible 
on the evidence at hand and whether it substantiated the defense theory. 
PowerPoint display 
 The State used a PowerPoint presentation during its rebuttal closing argument with a 
slide that contained an illustration purporting to set out facts that disprove any notion of 
coincidence, defense counsel objected and was overruled. The court concluded that the slide 
alleging “a circle of guilt” was not an error of a constitutional dimension and did not 
substantially affect the verdict. 
Burns’ agreement to a specific sentence precludes his arguments that the sentence was 
unreasonable and unconstitutional 
 While not barred by the appeal waiver, Burns’ challenge to the life-without-parole 
sentence is barred by his stipulation to that sentence as part of the Agreement. The court saw no 
reason to treat the Agreement any differently than a plea agreement, and because Burns received 
the benefit of his bargain, he cannot challenge the sentence on appeal.  
Conclusion: 
 Burns’ mid-trial waiver applied to the entirety of “the guilt phase of the trial,” including 
all parts of the trial up to the jury’s verdict as to his guilt, covering all of his claims raised on 
appeal, except those regarding voir dire, closing arguments, and an unreasonable sentence. 
Burns’ convictions were affirmed because the district court did not err in denying a Batson 
challenge during jury selection where defense counsel offered no explanation besides anecdotes 
from other cases counsel had argued and references to other matters before the court, and the 
State did not engage in reversible prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments because the 
prosecution's response was a permissible comment on the evidence at hand and whether it 
substantiated the defense theory, not impermissible shifting of the burden of proof. 
 
4  Whitney v. State, 112 Nev. 499 (1996). 
